Behavioral economics reading list

This is not a full behavioral economics syllabus.

It is the shelf behind lock in: the work that treats self-control as an environment problem, not a pep talk problem. The useful question is not "how do I become a different person?" The useful question is "what structure should exist before the later moment arrives?"

Start here if you want the logic under the product.

Start with the problem

Thomas Schelling, "Egonomics, or the Art of Self-Management"

Schelling is the cleanest starting point because he writes about self-command as an internal strategic problem. People use tricks, constraints, and delegated authority because the person making the plan and the person facing the temptation do not always want the same thing.

This is the old version of the lock in idea: do not wait for the future self to negotiate fairly.

David Laibson, "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting"

Laibson gives the formal economic shape to the problem. Hyperbolic discounting means the near term can get overweighted in a way that makes earlier plans unstable. A commitment device is useful because it changes what the future self can liquidate, weaken, or consume too easily.

For lock in, the lesson is simple: too much liquidity can be a bug.

Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, "Doing It Now or Later"

O'Donoghue and Rabin separate people who understand their future self-control problem from people who do not. That distinction matters. A serious commitment product is built for people who already know they will bargain with themselves later.

The product does not have to convince them they have a problem. It has to let them price the next miss before the excuse gets a vote.

Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch, "Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment"

Ariely and Wertenbroch show that people will choose costly deadlines for themselves, and that those deadlines can help. They also show a more uncomfortable point: people do not always set the deadlines well.

That is why the product should make the rule concrete. Place. Window. Radius. Penalty. Not a vague intention with a reminder attached.

Then read the field evidence

Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan, and Wesley Yin, "Tying Odysseus to the Mast"

This is the commitment savings paper. People were offered an account that restricted access to their own money until a chosen date or goal. Some took it. Those offered the product saved more than the control group.

The important part is not that every person wants restriction. The important part is that some people knowingly choose restriction because they understand their own future behavior.

Xavier Giné, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Zinman, "Put Your Money Where Your Butt Is"

This paper tested a voluntary commitment contract for smoking cessation. Participants deposited money, took a later biochemical test, and forfeited the money if they failed.

The structure is blunt. That is why it matters. The consequence is not motivational copy. It is part of the contract.

Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi, "Save More Tomorrow"

Save More Tomorrow is a softer mechanism, but it is still about timing. People commit now to allocate future raises toward retirement savings. The decision is made before the future paycheck feels like spendable money.

The product lesson is timing again: the best moment to decide is often before the cost feels immediate.

Katherine Milkman, Julia Minson, and Kevin Volpp, "Holding the Hunger Games Hostage at the Gym"

Temptation bundling ties a tempting activity to a behavior people want themselves to do. In the study, access to audiobooks was linked to gym visits.

This is adjacent to lock in rather than identical. The mechanism is reward bundling, not penalty. But it points at the same premise: behavior changes when the environment changes what is available at the decisive moment.

What this means for lock in

lock in is built around a narrow claim.

If a rule matters, it should be chosen early, written plainly, and made harder to dilute when the mood changes.

That leads to a few product decisions:

• choose the rule before the bargaining starts
• make the standard physical when the behavior is physical
• keep the window and consequence visible
• add friction where weakening the rule would destroy the point
• make the miss real enough that showing up becomes the cleaner option

None of this requires a moral story about willpower. It assumes something more specific: people are not one stable negotiator across time.

So the system should protect the earlier decision from the later negotiation.